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NOTES
JUSTICE AND THE JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE:
A NEW APPROACH TO ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS
JOHN T. GOODWIN*
No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
-Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution
INTRODUCTION
It is not surprising that the Framers of the Constitution drafted the
Fifth Amendment to provide property with the same due process protec-
tion granted to life and liberty. Like the other two famous rights, a citi-
zen's ability to be secure in the belief that his or her property cannot be
taken arbitrarily is a basic characteristic of a free society. The pragmatic
rationale for protecting property from capricious seizure is strong. Secure
property rights encourage investment, allow borrowing to occur, and
help to create a stable society.' Despite these benefits, the Fifth Amend-
ment also clearly contemplates that private property rights can be taken
away, if just compensation is provided. As a result, there is an inherent
tension in the Fifth Amendment between the Due Process Clause and
the Takings Clause that has spawned a great deal of debate with varying
levels of intensity during different time periods.
This tension is currently waxing as a result of the 2005 Supreme
Court case Kelo v. City of New London.2 The holding in Kelo solidified a
broad reading of the Public Use Clause that equates public purpose with
* J.D., 2010, University of Notre Dame Law School; B.S.B.A., 2007, Xavier Uni-
versity. I would like to thank all members of the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy for their comments and editing assistance. I would also like to thank Profes-
sor Nicole Garnett. Her classes on property and urban property law were invaluable in
helping me to develop many of the ideas found in this note.
1. See Carol M. Rose, Propter Honoris Respectum: Property as the Keystone Right?, 71
NOTRE DAME L. Riv. 329 (1996) (describing the benefits of systems which provide
protection for property rights).
2. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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public use and which consequently allows property to be taken from one
private party and given to another as part of an economic development
plan. 3 This holding was the correct statement of the law as established by
Supreme Court precedent; 4 however, it drastically increased the chance
that disenfranchised citizens will be subject to condemnation proceedings
that benefit those who enjoy political influence. Because of this substan-
tial potential for abuse, legislatures should work to mitigate the harms
that will result from Kelo by establishing a new model governing situa-
tions where private property is seized for economic development pur-
poses. Many commentators have attempted to develop such a model.
The purpose of this Note is to propose a new approach that is preferable
to these alternatives.
To accomplish this, Part I explains and critiques the rationale
behind Kelo and its precedents; Part II describes various abuses, both
potential and realized, that result from the standard articulated in Kelo;
Part III contrasts various models that commentators have developed and
courts have employed to address economic development takings; and
Part IV synthesizes these standards into a model that could improve the
urban development process by establishing a balance between the prop-
erty rights of individuals and the need, in some circumstances, to transfer
property from one private owner to another in the interest of furthering
the public good.
I. KELO AND ITS PRECEDENTS
The line of cases discussed in this section involves situations where a
local, state, or federal government agency takes property from one private
individual and gives it to another with the eventual goal of benefiting the
public. These types of takings are commonly referred to as "economic
development takings" because local governments often use them to stim-
ulate new economic development by taking private property and giving it
to a developer. 5 In these situations, the public benefit is often character-
3. Id. at 479.
4. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 29 (1954) (finding that it was permissible
for the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency to seize appellant department
store owners' property, because doing so was consistent with the public purpose of
removing blight); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (finding that it
was permissible for the Hawaii Housing authority to seize the property of appellee land-
owners, because doing so was consistent with the public purpose of decreasing the con-
centration of land ownership).
5. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (referring to the "eco-
nomic development taking.. . at issue in this case"). One can contrast economic devel-
opment takings with the relatively uncontroversial class of takings that involve the seizure
of private property for the construction of federal government buildings and projects. For
example, the Court took it for granted that "the United States government [has the]
power to appropriate lands or other property within the States for its own uses." United
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ized in terms of increased tax revenue, more jobs, and the elimination of
blight.
6
A. Economic Development Takings in the
Early Twentieth Century
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases to construe the Public Use
Clause to encompass public purpose takings was Fallbrook Irrigation Dis-
trict v. Bradley.7 In Bradley, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of
an act that organized the structure of irrigation districts, and provided for
the acquisition of water and other property by the government of Cali-
fornia.8 The act allowed land to be seized for the construction of irriga-
tion ditches, the rights to which were then allocated to private parties. 9
The plaintiff challenged this act on the ground that it would result in
"taking by legislation the property of one person or class of persons and
giving it to another, which is an arbitrary act of pure spoliation."'0
Rejecting this argument, the Court upheld the act because "[t]o irrigate,
and thus to bring into possible cultivation, these large masses of other-
wise worthless lands would . . . be a public purpose, and a matter of
public interest, not confined to" the private parties who received the
land.'' Simply stated, it was permissible for the state to transfer property
between private individuals, as long as furthering the public good was the
object of the transfer. It was irrelevant that the land in question was never
actually available to, or used by, the general public.
The Court continued to build on the foundation for economic
development takings it laid in Bradley with its decision in Strickley v.
Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. ten years later.12 In Strickley, the plaintiff
was a mining company that sought to condemn a right of way for an
aerial bucket line between its mine and a nearby railway station. 13 The
defendants alleged that the taking was "solely for private use" and "con-
trary to the 14th [sic] Amendment."' 4 The Court cited an earlier case to
support its holding that a "use by the general public ... test" is inade-
quate for determining what constitutes a public use.' 5 Thus the Court
followed Bradley in holding that the term "public use" includes situations
States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 237 (1946) (quoting Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S.
367 (1875)).
6. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.
7. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
8. Id. at 152.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 153.
11. Id. at 161.
12. 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
13. Id. at 529.
14. Id. at 530.
15. Id. at 531 (citing Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905)).
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where the public is generally benefited by a taking, regardless of whether
a private party obtains possession of the property.' 6 The Court incorpo-
rated into its jurisprudence the permissive standard of review for eco-
nomic development takings articulated in these two cases, and followed it
with little debate for a number of years.' 7
The rapid rise in the number of economic development takings that
occurred during and after the Great Depression facilitated additional
major developments in public purpose takings jurisprudence.'" Two fed-
eral acts encouraged this trend: the United States Housing Act of 1937
and the Housing Act of 1949. First, the 1937 Act provided "financial
assistance to the States ...for the elimination of unsafe and insanitary
housing conditions, for the eradication of slums ...and for . . . the
stimulation of business activity."' 9 The 1937 Act spurred on little eco-
nomic development because of budgetary difficulties created by World
War 1I,2° however, the 1949 Act was a different matter. Congress passed
this second Act in part "to provide Federal aid to assist slum-clearance
projects."' The 1949 Act led to a "massive influx of funds for use by
local agencies for urban redevelopment," resulting in a dramatic
reshaping of the urban landscape.2 2
B. Berman v. Parker
The Supreme Court case of Berman v. Parker stemmed from the
explosion of urban redevelopment planning caused in part by the fund-
ing the 1949 Act provided.2 3 The case at issue arose from a challenge to
the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.24 The D.C. Act
authorized "all means necessary and appropriate for the purpose" of
removing blight and improving human habitation, and declared that "the
acquisition .. .of real property .. pursuant to a project area redevelop-
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Brush v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 352 (1937); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135 (1921); Union Lime Co. v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 233 U.S. 211 (1914); Borden
v. Trespalacios Rice & Irrigation Co., 204 U.S. 667 (1907).
18. See George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo: What's Blight Got to Do
With It?, 17 S. CAL. REv. L. & Soc. JusT. 803, 837 (2008) (noting that 21,000 units of
public housing were constructed between 1934 and 1937).
19. U.S. Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937).
20. Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go From Here?, 60
U. CHt. L. REv. 497, 500 (1993).
21. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 388, 63 Stat. 413 (1949).
22. Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain after Kelo v. City of New London: An
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491,
510 (2006).
23. 348 U.S. 26 (1955).
24. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, 60 Stat. 790
(1946). The 1945 Act authorized the Berman taking, and the 1949 Act provided federal
funding for the project.
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ment plan ... is . . .a public use."'25 The Act was used to institute a
redevelopment project for a region in southwest Washington, D.C.,
where only 17.3% of the dwellings were considered "satisfactory." 26 The
residents of the redevelopment area were almost exclusively poor, and
97.5% were African American. 27 The region's Director of Health judged
that it was necessary to redevelop the area "in the interests of public
health," and instituted preliminary condemnation proceedings.2i
The plaintiff filed suit to prevent his department store from being
taken in furtherance of the redevelopment plan. He claimed that the Act
was unconstitutional because the property was going to be put "under
the management of a private, not a public, agency and redeveloped for
private, not public, use."'2 9 The Court rejected the plaintiff's arguments
using incredibly broad language. First, the Court stated that "[p]ublic
safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, [and] law and order ...
are some of the .. .traditional application[s] of the police power." 30 As
the legislature is "the main guardian of the public needs to be served by
social legislation," the "role of the judiciary in determining whether [the
eminent domain] power is being exercised for the public purpose is a
very narrow one." 3 1 The housing conditions in the redevelopment area
were "[m]iserable and disreputable," tended to spread "disease and crime
and immorality," and were "an ugly sore" that could "despoil a commu-
nity as an open sewer may ruin a river." 32 As a result, the Court believed
that it was totally within the discretion of the legislature to use any
means it deemed necessary to remedy the conditions in the redevelop-
ment area. 33 The Court concluded its decision by stating that "[i]f those
who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital
should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth
Amendment that stands in the way."
34
The sweeping interpretation of the Public Use Clause that Berman
established is troubling. The decision appears to allow a taking to occur
simply if the redevelopment area is unattractive. Such a standard allows
private property to be transferred from one individual to another on a
threadbare pretext and creates a substantial risk of abuse by special inter-
ests at the expense of all those who live in "disreputable" areas.35
25. Id. at§ 2.
26. Berman, 348 U.S. at 30.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 31.
30. Id. at 32.
31. Id
32. Id. at 32-33.
33. Id
34. Id. at 33.
35. Id. at 32.
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C. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
The next case to further solidify the public purpose interpretation of
the Public Use Clause was Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff36 There,
the issue was the constitutionality of a Hawaiian law that allowed the
state to seize property, with just compensation, from lessors and then
transfer it to lessees for the purpose of reducing the concentration of land
assets.37 At the time this case was decided, land ownership in Hawaii was
extremely concentrated, with over 40% of the land owned by eighteen
private landowners.38 This concentration was particularly pronounced on
Oahu, Hawaii's most urbanized island, where twenty-two landowners
held tide to 72.5% of the land."9 The state legislature concluded that
"concentrated land ownership was responsible for skewing the State's res-
idential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public
tranquility and welfare," and resolved to remedy the situation."0 The leg-
islature passed the Land Reform Act of 1967,41 "which created a mecha-
nism for condemning residential tracts and for transferring ownership of
the condemned fees simple to existing lessees."42
The plaintiffs in Midkiffchallenged this Act as unconstitutional in
1979 after refusing to submit to a compulsory arbitration order that
would have resulted in the seizure of their property.43 In a decision writ-
ten by Justice O'Connor, the Court, drawing heavily from the language
in Berman, first held that "[t]he 'public use' requirement is . . . cotermi-
nous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."44 The Court went
on to establish the amount of discretion afforded legislative determina-
tions on what constitutes a public use, and, again quoting Berman, the
Court held that the scope of review is "an extremely narrow one." 4 5 In
establishing the standard of review, the Court gave a high degree of def-
erence to legislatures. It favorably cited a past decision holding that "def-
erence to the legislature's 'public use' determination is required 'until it is
shown to involve an impossibility.' 4 6 The Court also cited United States
v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., which held that a court should not
disregard a legislative determination on what constitutes public use,
"unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation." 47 Drawing
36. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
37. Id. at 231.
38. Id. at 232.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 516-1(2), (11), 516-22 (1977).
42. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233.
43. Id. at 234.
44. Id. at 240.
45. Id. (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
46. Id. (quoting Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)).
47. 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896).
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from these past holdings, the Court articulated its standard of review:
"When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irra-
tional, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of
takings ... are not to be carried out in the federal courts."48 As a result,
the plaintiffs' challenge was defeated because "[r]egulating oligopoly and
the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's... powers" and
the Court could not "condemn as irrational the Act's approach to cor-
recting the land oligopoly problem."
49
After the Midkiff decision, it appeared that a legislative determina-
tion on what constituted public use was virtually unassailable. The
seizure of private property was a constitutionally valid means for exercis-
ing any state police power, and property owners could do little to resist
it. By the time Kelo reached the Supreme Court, proponents for a nar-
rower interpretation of the Public Use Clause must have been hoping
that the Court would use the opportunity to retreat from the broad inter-
pretation that Berman and Midkiff established.5" These proponents were
sorely disappointed.
D. Kelo v. City of New London
1. Factual Background
In 2000, the Connecticut city of New London approved a develop-
ment plan projected to create 1,000 jobs, increase tax revenues, and
"revitalize an economically distressed city."51 In order to realize its goals,
the city set about acquiring property by purchasing it from willing sellers,
and by using its eminent domain power to coercively take the property of
unwilling sellers. 52 While the development plan was being finalized, Pfi-
zer, a giant in the pharmaceutical business, announced that it would con-
struct a $300 million research facility adjacent to the development area. 53
The city incorporated the Pfizer facility into its plans and "intended the
development plan to capitalize on the arrival of the Pfizer facility and the
new commerce it was expected to attract." 54 The New London City
Council approved the plan in 2000, and the condemnation proceedings
that gave rise to this case were instituted.
55
48. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242-43.
49. Id. at 242.
50. See, e.g., Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68 U.M.K.C. L. REv.
49, 75 (1999) (arguing that a more robust role for courts in the economic development
process would be "reasonable"); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 61, 111 (1986) (arguing for heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative
determinations of public use under certain circumstances).
51. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 473.
54. Id. at 474.
55. Id. at 472.
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The Kelo petitioners all owned property in the development area.
56
The city did not claim that any of the properties were blighted or in a
state of disrepair.5 7 Instead, "they were condemned only because they
happen[ed] to be located in the development area. ' 58 The petitioners
first brought this dispute before the New London Superior Court, and
alleged that, "the taking of their properties would violate the 'public use'
restriction in the Fifth Amendment." 59 After the petitioners' claim was
defeated at trial and on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certio-
rari "to determine whether a city's decision to take property for the pur-
pose of economic development satisfies the 'public use' requirement of
the Fifth Amendment.
60
2. The Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion for the Court, which
affirmed the lower court's ruling by holding that because the "plan
unquestionably serve[d] a public purpose, the takings .. .satisflied] the
public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment." 6' The Court began its
analysis by stating that, "the City would no doubt be forbidden from
taking petitioners' land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on
a particular private party."6 2 The takings in this case, however, were "exe-
cuted pursuant to a 'carefully considered' development plan," which, the
Court believed, cast doubt on the petitioners' contention that the plan
was instituted for an illegitimate private purpose.6 3 Next, the Court eval-
uated the "use by the public" definition the petitioners supported.64 This
definition would require any land taken in an eminent domain procedure
to be used by the public, not simply used for the benefit of the public.
The Court discarded the "use by the public" definition because prece-
dent had "steadily eroded [it] over time. ' 65 The Court found the "use by
the public" standard unsatisfactory because it was "difficult to adminis-
ter" and "impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of soci-
ety."6 6 The Court concluded by citing Strickley, Berman, and Midkiff to
establish that Supreme Court precedent uniformly supported a broad
interpretation of the Public Use Clause.67 Therefore, the Court held that
instead of employing "rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny" to evaluate
56. Id. at 475.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 477.
61. Id. at 484.
62. Id. at 477.
63. Id. at 478.
64. Id. at 477.
65. Id. at 479.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 480-81.
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public use determinations made by legislatures, courts should give legisla-
tures "broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of
the takings power."68
Next, the Court applied this standard to the facts in Kelo and found
that the city was entitled to use its eminent domain powers to support its
"carefully formulated . .. economic development plan."69 It rejected the
petitioners' argument advocating for a bright-line rule forbidding eco-
nomic development takings because "[piromoting economic develop-
ment is a traditional and long-accepted function of government. "70 The
Court spent little time evaluating the merits of a bright-line rule inde-
pendent of its incompatibility with past precedents, but it rightly con-
cluded that it would be anomalous, in light of those precedents, for it to
forbid economic development takings in New London, given the broad
definition of public use established by Berman and Midkiff. The petition-
ers argued that the lack of a bright-line rule would leave nothing to "stop
a city from transferring citizen A's property to citizen B for the sole rea-
son that citizen B will put the property to a more productive use and thus
pay more taxes."7 1 However, this argument did not sway the Court
because, in the case at issue, such a one-to-one transfer was absent. 72 This
suggests that if such a transfer were present, the Court would apply a
higher standard of review to the legislature's determination, and perhaps
the taking would be invalidated. Such a safeguard was unavailable to the
Kelo petitioners, however, and the city's authority to take the property
was affirmed. 7
3
3. Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy used his concurring opinion to flesh out the safe-
guard the majority identified as purporting to protect citizens from one-
to-one private transfers. 74 Kennedy agreed with the majority that the def-
erential rational basis standard of review was appropriate for evaluating
actions by legislatures, but he added that "transfers intended to confer
benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental
or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.
75
In explanation, Kennedy analogized the application of this standard to
68. Id. at 483.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 484.
71. Id. at 486-87.
72. Id. at 487 ("While such an unusual exercise of government power would cer-
tainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot, the hypothetical cases posited by
petitioners can be confronted if and when they arise.").
73. Id. at 489.
74. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[Tlransfers intended to confer benefits
on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public bene-
fits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.").
75. Id at 490.
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the enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause. A court applying
rational basis review "should strike down a taking that, by a clear show-
ing, is intended to favor a particular private party... just as a court...
must strike down a government classification that is dearly intended to
injure a particular class of private parties."76 In order to apply this stan-
dard, a "court confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible
favoritism to private parties should treat the objection as a serious one
and review the record to see if it has merit, though with the presumption
that the government's actions were reasonable and intended to serve a
public purpose." 7
7
Applying the rational basis standard to the facts in Kelo, Kennedy
agreed with the trial court "that benefiting Pfizer was not the primary
motivation or effect of this development plan; instead, the primary moti-
vation for [respondents] was to take advantage of Pfizer's presence."78
There was no indication in the record that the development plan was
intended to benefit a private party. 79 Therefore, Kennedy voted with the
majority to deny the petitioners relief.
4. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, signaled an apparent depar-
ture from the majority opinion she authored in Midkiff. She wrote that
the effect of the majority's opinion in Kelo was "effectively to delete the
words 'for public use' from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,"
and agreed with petitioners that it allowed the government to take an
individual's "property for the private use of other owners simply because
the new owners may make more productive use of the property."8 ° She
would have held that all takings with the sole purpose of furthering eco-
nomic development are unconstitutional as a result.8 ' O'Connor
attempted to distinguish Kelo from Midkiffand Berman because in both
of those cases, the condemnation itself led to a public benefit, so the
public use requirement had already been satisfied by the time the prop-
erty reached the hands of a private party.8 2 In comparison, the properties
taken in Kelo were "well-maintained homes [and not] the source of any
social harm."83 If these properties could be taken, O'Connor concluded
that there was nothing "to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6
with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a
76. Id. at 491.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 492 (citing App. to Pet. For Cert. 276).
79. Id. at 492.
80. Id. at 494-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 499-500.
82. Id at 500.
83. Id
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factory."84 As a result, she believed the majority gave government the
"license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those
with more," a dangerous precedent to set.
8 5
O'Connor's position seems especially difficult to square with
Midkif, where she wrote that the Court "will not substitute its judgment
for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use 'unless the
use be palpably without reasonable foundation.'"86 The actions of New
London appear to fall well within this standard, so perhaps O'Connor
was advocating for Midkiff to be overruled without explicitly stating her
intention. In addition, the Court in Berman allowed the government to
take property belonging to a department store owner for the purpose of
creating "a better balanced, more attractive community."87 There is no
indication from the record that the plaintiffs department store was dilap-
idated or in a state of disrepair; it was taken as part of a wider develop-
ment plan, just like the property in Kelo. As a result, it appears that the
holding in Kelo was a natural extension of prior Supreme Court holdings
and unassailable from a precedential perspective.
Justice Thomas filed the second and final dissenting opinion, which
none of the other justices joined. Thomas strongly disagreed with the
majority's view, and he would have departed even further than
O'Connor from precedent. He employed a textual argument to advocate
for a more "natural" interpretation of the Public Use Cause.88 This inter-
pretation would require the overturning of Berman and Midkiff, and the
adoption of a strict "use by the public" test for satisfying the Public Use
Clause.8 9 As a result, Thomas would have held that "the government
may take property only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right
to use the property."9 ' Thomas's test would invalidate all economic
development takings, which would provide a great deal more protection
for the property rights of those with little political influence. However, it
would also hamstring local governments by depriving them of one of
their most useful tools for achieving economic revitalization.
84. Id. at 503.
85. Id. at 505.
86. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (quoting United
States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
87. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31.
88. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 515.
90. Id. at 521.
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I1. POTENTIAL ABUSES RESULTING FROM
THE KELO DECISION
Corruption has been an inescapable aspect of political systems for as
long as they have been in existence. 9 ' As a result, there remains a very
real danger that unscrupulous individuals will bend the political process
to their own ends. The potential payout is high for private parties who
assist cities in economic development schemes, so there is a particular
danger that developers will use the Kelo holding to force unsatisfactory
plans through local legislatures to the detriment of poor communities.
This section describes many of the injustices that may result from this
process. These descriptions are followed by the example of Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,92 a case where a private party
manipulated the local legislative process and then used it to the detri-
ment of a community.
A. Unfairness Arising During the Eminent Domain Process
1. Undercompensation
The potential that property owners will be undercompensated is a
danger in all eminent domain cases, but it is particularly pronounced in
cases of economic development takings because the condemnees usually
have few legal or financial resources to resist the taking." According to
the Takings Clause, when property is taken from a private individual he
or she must receive "just compensation. "9' Modern eminent domain
jurisprudence tends to use fair market value (FMV) as a proxy for just
compensation. 95 This method is logical, to some extent, but it almost
91. See generally Fidel V. Ramos, Good Governance Against Corruption, 25
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 9, 9-10 (2001) (noting corruption in the United States,
Japan, India, Germany, France, and others); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Political Corruption
and Democracy, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 363, 363 (1999) (discussing the dangerous effects
corruption can have on democracies); Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative
Analysis of International Corruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARuz. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 793 (2001) (discussing the "limitless" ways officials can abuse their author-
ity for personal gain).
92. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
93. See Daniel B. Kelly, The 'Public Use'Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. Rv. 1, 39-40
(2006) (discussing the "superior legal sophistication and financial resources" of private
developers relative to "low-income and working-class homeowners").
94. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
95. See Kirby Forest Industries v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (holding
that "just compensation" means in most cases the fair market value of the property on the
date it is appropriated); Portland Nat'l Gas Transmission Sys. v. 19.2 Acres of Land, 195
F.Supp.2d 314, 320 (D. Mass. 2002) (defining "fair market value" as the highest price a
hypothetical buyer would pay in an open market for the property at issue); Faith Temple
Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F.Supp.2d 250, 256 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[P]roperty
taken by condemnation literally comes at a price: the fair market value of the property.").
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certainly causes property owners to be undercompensated, particularly
from the property owner's perspective. Presumably, before eminent
domain proceedings are instituted, the entity seeking to acquire the prop-
erty has offered market value (or at least an estimation thereof) to the
owner. Some owners hold out in order to extort a higher price from the
acquiring agency, but many simply believe that their property is worth
more than the market value estimation would suggest.
9 6
Several factors could support an owner's belief that the value of his
or her property surpasses its market value. One is the sentimental value
the owner attaches to it, especially if he has lived on the property for a
long time. Alternatively, the owner could be elderly, which would make
finding and moving to another home extremely difficult. The owner
might also find value in his familiarity with an area, and from residing in
a community of friends and neighbors. Conversely, the owner faces sig-
nificant additional costs not inherent in the property's FMV if he or she
is forced to move to a new place to live, because there is a risk that the
owner will not be able to find a suitable replacement property. This
causes harm to the owner if he or she is unable to find a new place to live
that is as desirable as the old property, which ideally should be taken into
account in determining just compensation. The purpose of eminent
domain is to spread the costs of a taking to all taxpayers, instead of forc-
ing a small group of individuals or families to bear the brunt of the
burden.97 Therefore, just compensation should ideally include these
additional costs instead of being limited to an estimation of FMV.
2. Private Party Benefit Capture
The problem of private party benefit capture is related to the prob-
lem of undercompensation. Specifically, economic development is con-
ducted in such a way that a few select individuals receive a fabulous
payout, while affected residents may not even be fully compensated for
the loss they incur. There are two principal ways for private parties to
capture a disproportionate amount of the benefits from economic
development.
First, aggregating several parcels of land into a single parcel causes a
significant increase in the total value of the property.9 8 To illustrate this
See also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.
REv. 531, 540 (2005) (challenging the current use of market value to calculate just com-
pensation). But see Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL.
ECON. 473, 493 (1976) (describing the empirical result that high-value properties receive
more than fair market value, while low-value properties receive less).
96. See Merrill, supra note 50, at 83 (describing the "subjective premium" that
condemnees may place on their property above the fair market value).
97. Id. at 82.
98. See Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HAav. L. REv.
1465, 1476 (2008) ("[A] quarter-acre parcel in a rundown residential neighborhood
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concept, assume that a community contains Property A, Property B, and
Property C, which are of roughly equivalent size. Individual residents
own these properties, which are located in an economically depressed
area. Property B is blighted, but the other two parcels are not. As a result,
Property A has a market value of $35,000, Property B has a market value
of $20,000, and Property C has a market value of $30,000, for a total
market value of $85,000. Now assume that these properties are taken
through eminent domain, assembled into a single parcel, Property ABC,
and given to a corporation to be used as the location for a new commer-
cial park. As a result, property ABC would significantly appreciate in
value. 99 For illustrative purposes, assume that property ABC is now
worth $200,000, a large (but not unrealistic) increase over the $85,000
the former owners were given as compensation.'"° The value of Property
ABC is greater than the sum of its parts because, due to its increase in
size, the number of profitable uses the parcel can be put to has increased
might be worth a small fraction of a quarter-acre parking lot next to a glittering new
festival mall.").
99. Id. See generally Merrill, supra note 50, at 85 ("[A] resource's value after con-
demnation is almost always higher than before.").
100. The appreciation in value from $85,000 to $200,000 may seem large; how-
ever, it is not unrealistic. See id. at 1468 ("Based on several standard valuation methods,
the assembled value that private developers would have paid for [a] site would have been
as much as three times higher" than the $86 in fair market value million they actually
paid for it."). It is very difficult to measure with precision the amount of appreciation
that occurs after land is assembled because so much of the land's post-assembly value is
speculative. Much of this value is based on future events and possibilities, rather than
hard data, because once land is assembled, its value can vary widely depending on the use
it is put to and several other factors. For example, if land is assembled to facilitate the
building of a public park, its value would likely be much lower than if it is assembled to
make way for a popular sports team's stadium. Additionally, even when the future use of
post-assembly land is determined with certainty, difficulties in estimating post-assembly
value persist. Considering a plan to build a stadium, for example, the value of the land
the stadium is to be built on would depend on a multitude of factors, including the
increase in the fan base the construction will create, local and national public support for
the team, ticket sales projections, demographic changes, changes in local regulations, and
tax considerations. Additionally, every project is different, so even if a particular valuation
method fits one project, there is no guarantee that it will be relevant for a different set of
circumstances. As a result, the values in this section and in Part IV(A) for illustrative
purposes (appreciation from $85,000 to $200,000 after assembly) are not based on one
particular model. However, while standard valuation models can have widely disparate
results when analyzing land assembly projects, appreciation of over 200% is not uncom-
mon. See id. (discussing appreciation of approximately 300%); see also Leslie Kent
Beckhart, No Intrinsic Value: The Failure of Traditional Real Estate Appraisal Methods to
Value Income-Producing Propery, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2251, 2279 (discussing many of the
difficulties inherent in the real-estate valuation process); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of
the Anticommons: Property in the Transition Jrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REv.
621, 674-75 (1998) (discussing the "tragedy of the anticommons" that is created when
the cooperation of numerous owners is needed to utilize resources efficiently).
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dramatically.1 ' Additionally, the expected benefit from owning the
property becomes larger when the corporation makes it clear that it
intends to expend resources on an economic development project, if the
parties with an interest in the property can expect to receive a share of
those resources.
On its face, this hypothetical may not seem overly problematic, and
may even make the actions of the corporation appear beneficial; the value
of the property can more than double, after all.5 0 2 Also, if the project is
successful, jobs will be created, and there is a chance that the economi-
cally depressed region around Property ABC will be revitalized. At the
same time, it seems inherently unfair that the property owners were
forced to sell their homes for $85,000 while the beneficiary corporation
received a $200,000 transfer in the form of the same property, creating a
windfall for the corporation of $115,000. A more equitable model for
economic development takings could be achieved if the former property
owners, rather than the corporation alone, could capture some of the
$115,000 windfall. 10 3
The second manner in which developers capture the benefits from
eminent domain is by demanding substantial discounts from local gov-
ernments when they purchase condemned land. 10 4 The market for cities
attempting to attract developers is highly competitive, and, as a result,
local governments are often willing to transfer property to developers at a
substantial discount. 10 5 For example, using the information from the
hypothetical above, assume that the city acquired the three properties for
$85,000 through eminent domain proceedings costing $10,000. In addi-
tion, the city conditioned the properties for the corporation by demolish-
ing the existing structures for $18,000, by grading the land for $5,000,
and by widening the surrounding roads for $30,000. As a result, the total
cost to the city was $148,000. Despite this substantial cost, the city is
likely to offer a large discount to the corporation as part of its bid to
attract the corporation to the city.1 0 6 It would not be unusual for a parcel
of property as described in this hypothetical to be sold to a corporation
for as little as $10,000, or even less. 10 7 The corporation in this example
101. When the parcels were separate, any new construction would be confined by
the borders of an individual parcel. Once the individual parcels are assembled into one
piece of property, a greater variety of larger (and more profitable) structures can be built.
102. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text for an explanation of why
this is so.
103. See infra Part VI for a description of such a model.
104. See Cohen, supra note 22, at 498 (characterizing economic development tak-
ings as inefficient because the acquired property is often sold at a discount).
105. Id
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d
455, 455 (Detroit spent over $200 million to prepare the development site, which was
then sold to GM for a meager $8 million.); Heller & Hills, supra note 98, at 1476
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now has a $200,000 piece of property for which it paid $10,000, creating
an instantaneous and virtually risk-free return on investment of 2000%.
Once again, it seems unfair that the developer is able to capture this
entire benefit while the condemnees are not even fully compensated for
their losses.
3. Capture of the Political Process
Large corporations are often so successful at capturing the benefits
of economic development takings because they enjoy a degree of political
and economic influence that corresponds to their size. 108 Corporations
have political influence because they can afford to pay the best lobbyists
for advocating development plans to local governments and they can
afford to provide generous campaign contributions.'0 9 Even if this pro-
cess does not lead to outright corruption, development proposals are gen-
erally first presented to local governments by developers themselves.
Therefore, the first voice politicians hear when it comes to a proposed
economic development project is one which is firmly in favor of the pro-
ject. In contrast, the targets of economic development takings generally
have few resources relative to the proponents of development plans." 0
While it is true that groups such as the Institute for Justice, which repre-
sented the plaintiffs in Kelo, can foot the bill when eminent domain pro-
ceedings are initiated, these groups cannot help everyone and can do little
to disrupt the planning process that often makes litigation necessary in
the first place. 1 1
(discussing a project where the developer paid roughly one-third of the property's FMV);
Claire Vitucci, Corona Agrees to Office Project: The Deal Calls for the City to Acquire Four
Parcels Surrounding the Site on South Main Street, PREss ENTEPRISE (RIVERSIDE, CA),
Apr. 20, 2000, at BI (developer purchased four parcels of land for $1). See also infra Part
II.B.2.i.
108. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238,
258 (1986) ("The availability of [corporate] resources may make a corporation a formida-
ble political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of
the power of its ideas.").
109. See Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations are People too: A Multi-Dimensional
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FoRDHAm J. CoRp. & FIN. L. 97, 143
(2009) ("Large corporations spend millions of dollars annually in lobbying efforts to
impact government policies."); Jill E. Fisch, The "Bad Man" Goes to Washington: The
Effect of Political Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1593, 1606-07
(2006) (surveying various lobbying efforts by large corporations).
110. See Robert C. Bird, Reviving Necessity in Eminent Domain, 33 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 239, 261 (2010) ("A government's exercise of eminent domain can be an
unjust and traumatic process that favors the wealthy and hurts the poor.").
111. In Kelo, several attorneys from the Institute for Justice appeared on behalf of
the petitioners. Reply Brief of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 U.S.
Briefs 108.
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To supplement political influence, corporations also have a great
deal of economic influence. 1 2 A small city that depends upon a single
large factory to employ thousands of workers would be highly receptive
to demands from the factory owner if the owner threatens to close down
its operations. This gives business owners a powerful ability to demand
concessions from local governments; the government can either exercise
its eminent domain powers, allowing the plant to expand, or it can lose
thousands of jobs for its constituents, as well as the tax revenue corre-
sponding to those jobs.i 13 To complement the threat of plant closings
and job losses, corporations can also offer local governments the incentive
of increased employment and tax revenue. However, estimates of the size
of these benefits can often become unjustifiably enthusiastic, which leads
to the fourth and final major source of unfairness in eminent domain
proceedings.
4. Overestimation of Benefits from Economic Development
It is very easy for cities to overestimate the benefits associated with a
development project, and many projects are instituted that end up cost-
ing much more than they are worth.114 This causes all taxpayers to suffer
a loss, particularly those whose property was transferred to developers.
The case described in the next section provides a stark example of how
overestimation of benefits from economic development can harm not
only condemnees, but also the governments exercising their eminent
domain powers.
112. As used in this Note, political influence is the ability to influence the legisla-
tive process. This influence is often derived from campaign contributions and lobbying.
In comparison, economic influence is derived from a firm's integral status as part of a
local economy. These concepts can be difficult to distinguish, because they often come
hand-in-hand. A firm with economic influence will often use it to gain political influ-
ence. The concepts are distinct, however, and they can affect the eminent domain process
in different ways. For example, a firm could exercise political influence by paying lobby-
ists to argue that an economic development project is vital to a local community. At the
same time, it could bring its economic influence to bear by threatening to close down
operations or shed jobs if its demands are not met.
113. The actions taken by General Motors in Poletown, discussed at length below,
are the paradigmatic example of this process. Additionally, the development plan in Kelo
was designed in part to take advantage of the $300 million research facility Pfizer
intended to build. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473. Other less dramatic examples of firms using
economic influence to encourage development include Anheuser-Busch's construction of
a warehouse and distribution facility, and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company's construction of
a distribution facility, both in New York City. New York City Economic Development
Corp., http://www.nycedc.comlBusinesslnNYC/SuccessStories (last visited Feb. 23,
2010).
114. See infra notes 144-149 and accompanying text for an example of these phe-
nomena. See generally Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand- Economic Development
Takings after Kelo, 15 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 183, 197 (2007)("Both business interests and
political leaders dependant on their support have tremendous incentives to overestimate
the economic benefits of projects furthered by condemnation.").
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B. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit
The Poletown" 5 case is often cited disfavorably in discussions about
economic development takings." 6 In the case, the Michigan Supreme
Court addressed the specific question of whether "a municipality [can]
use the power of eminent domain . .. to condemn property for transfer
to a private corporation to build a plant to promote industry and com-
merce, thereby adding jobs and taxes to the economic base of the munici-
pality and state."' ' 7 The court concluded that because the "power of
eminent domain [was] to be used ... primarily to accomplish the essen-
tial public purposes of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the eco-
nomic base of the community," it was a permissible exercise of the power
to take over a thousand homes and businesses, and then to transfer the
property to General Motors (GM) for the construction of an automobile
plant.' 18
1. Facts
In 1980, the state of Michigan was facing unemployment of
"calamitous proportions," particularly in the city of Detroit." 9 As Justice
Ryan noted in his Poletown dissent, unemployment statewide stood at
14.2%, unemployment in Detroit itself was 18%, and unemployment
among black citizens was approaching 30%.12' During this time, the
American automotive industry, upon which Detroit depended for
thousands of jobs and millions of dollars in tax revenue, was struggling to
compete with the increasingly successful Asian firms that were dominat-
ing the automotive industry.i 2 ' As a result, the Ford Motor Company,
the American Motors Corporation, and General Motors Corporation
were all reporting their largest financial losses in history.' 22 Unsurpris-
ingly, Detroit's governmental leaders were distressed to learn that GM
115. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 455. The Michigan Supreme Court's analysis of
this case dealt primarily with law peculiar to the state of Michigan. As a result, this
section will focus primarily on describing those circumstances surrounding the decision
that are common to many economic development takings, rather than describing the
court's reasoning.
116. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. Detroit, 28 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 651 (2005); William A. Fischel, The
Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of
Eminent Domain, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 929 (2004); Gail Gibson, A Neighborhood
Torn Down: Eminent Domain Brought Down Detroit's Poletown Enclave in 1981 to Make
Way for a GM Plant, but Justification is Under Fire Elsewhere, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 20,
2005, at Al.
117. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457.
118. Id. at 459.
119. Id. at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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was going to close its Cadillac and Fisher Body manufacturing opera-
tions, compounding the already depressed economic climate in the
city.' 23 As a result, the government was extremely receptive to GM's pro-
posal to construct a new plant in the city, which the firm claimed would
create over 6000 new jobs and offer a $15 million increase in property
tax revenue.
124
After brief negotiations during which GM dictated terms to Detroit
that it accepted with little analysis, the city condemned 465 acres of land
so that GM could build a plant of approximately three million square
feet in size. 125 The completion of the project required the destruction of
Poletown, an ethnic neighborhood on the east side of Detroit. 126 This
neighborhood was home to 3438 persons, who would have to be dis-
placed, and 1176 structures, including single-family homes, schools,
churches, and businesses, which would have to be destroyed.' 27 Many of
these residents moved to enjoin the condemnation proceedings, but they
were unsuccessful. The Poletown neighborhood was bulldozed to the
ground, and the GM plant was built in its place after a few years of
delay.12 The implementation of this plan required "sweeping away a
tightly-knit residential enclave of first- and second-generation Americans,
for many of whom their home was their single most valuable and cher-
ished asset, and their stable ethnic neighborhood the unchanging symbol
of the security and quality of their lives."' 29
2. Where the Process Went Awry
i. How Low Can You Go?
In Poletown, GM was able to use its high degree of economic and
political clout to extract a generous deal from the city of Detroit and
bring enormous pressure to bear on the people resisting the city's con-
demnation proceedings. Local Roman Catholic priests resisted the devel-
opment plan, but the church leadership was firmly in GM's corner.
13 1
Meanwhile, both the United Auto Workers and the local government
123. The mayor of Detroit, Coleman Young, said of the taking that led to the
Poletown case: "I consider it of great importance, the ability of the city to survive, and to
the ability of other industries in the industrial belt, that is the midwest, and the northeast,
all these cities face exactly the same problem as Detroit does, escalating unemployment
and decreasing population, the exodus of industry." Id. at 467 n.4.
124. Id. at 467.
125. Id. at 466.
126. Id. at 470.
127. Id. at 464 n.15 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
128. See James V. Higgins, GM Poletown Plant Sets the Pace Now; Factory Emerges
as Model of Efficiency, DETROIT NEws, Oct. 9, 2001, at C1.
129. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 470 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
130. Carla T. Main, How Eminent Domain Ran Amok, 133 POL'Y REv. 3, 17
(2005), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/2920831 .html.
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supported the condemnations. 31  Despite this pressure, residents of
Poletown resisted the condemnations. A small group of Catholic priests
went against their owe diocese to organize the initial lawsuit against
Detroit.132 In addition to litigating, some activists refused to vacate
structures until the last moment before they were demolished.
33
Despite this resistance, GM's plan advanced at a relentless pace. The
process began in the middle of 1980 when GM presented Detroit with a
list of demands for the city to satisfy if GM was to maintain a presence in
the city. It put further stress on Detroit by requiring that these demands
be met by May 1, 1981, putting a great deal of time pressure on both the
state legislature and the courts. 34 The process moved so rapidly, in fact,
that Justice Ryan was not able to include his dissenting opinion in the
Poletown decision until several days after the ruling was announced.
135
The most significant of GM's demands included four primary criteria for
the land it wanted to build its plant on: the land had to be between 450
and 500 acres in size, be rectangular in shape, have access to a long-haul
railroad line, and have access to a freeway system. 136 The city conducted
in-depth studies of nine sites in total and submitted reports to GM for
approval. 137 GM rejected eight of these sites, and settled on the area of
land that was the subject of the Poletown dispute. 138
Nevertheless, before GM was willing to take title to this land, it
required Detroit to conduct several expensive improvements, both to the
parcel of land and to the surrounding infrastructure. For the roads
around the site, GM required the city to relocate and extend East Grand
Boulevard (which at the time ran through the site), widen other nearby
roads, and construct new roads to circumnavigate the site. 139 The city
also had to construct a street lighting system along the perimeter road
and improve a major interstate. In addition, the city was expected to
dispose of, at its own expense, any "hazardous and toxic waste materials"
found on the site.' 4 ' The final estimate for the public cost of the project
included $87 million to compensate the former owners and to provide
for their relocation (approximately $30,000 per person displaced); $35
million for the demolition of existing structures; $23.5 million for road
improvements; $12 million for rail improvements; $3.5 million for pro-
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 16.
134. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 467 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 465.
136. Id. at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 469 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (citing letter and attach-
ments from Thomas A. Murphy, Chairman of the Bd., General Motors, to Coleman A.
Young, Mayor, City of Detroit (Oct. 8, 1980)).
140. Id.
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fessional services; and $38.7 million for "[o]ther [s]ite [p] reparation."' 4
On top of these expenses, the city agreed to provide GM with twelve
years of tax concessions. 142 In total, the projected cost reached over $200
million (the actual cost has been estimated at over $300 million), and yet
the site was sold to GM for a meager $8 million-a discount of 96%
from the projected cost.14 3
ii. The Return from Detroit's Investment
In exchange for an expected $200 million in public funds and the
displacement of thousands of its citizens, Detroit hoped to receive 6000
well-paying jobs for its workers, and millions of dollars in tax revenue.' 44
As Justice Ryan noted in his dissent, however, there would be "no public
control whatsoever over the management, or operation, or conduct of the
plant to be built," and "[the] level of employment at the new GM plant
[would] be determined by private corporate managers primarily with ref-
erence . . . to profit," not to the welfare of Detroit. 145 Having granted
GM its tax concessions and what amounted to a direct wealth transfer of
approximately $192 million, Detroit still had no leverage to encourage
GM to live up to its employment estimates. As Justice Ryan feared, the
benefits from the new plant were not as significant as Detroit had hoped:
the plant laid off 2500 workers in 1986,146 and by 1988, it was only
employing a total of 2500 workers. 147 Even at its peak, the GM plant
only managed to employ 3600 workers,'4 8 and as of 1989, only 2% of
these people were residents of the "revitalized" Poletown area. 9
141. Id. at 469, n.7 (citing and reprinting CITY OF DETROIT COMMUNITY &
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, Project Plan: Central Industrial Park, 11
(1980)).
142. Id. at 470 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
143. Main, supra note 130, at 17.
144. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457. According to one estimate, the city of Detroit
thought that the deal with GM had the "potential [to create] $15,000,000 in new prop-
erty tax revenues." Id. at 467 (Ryan J., dissenting) (quoting and reprinting DRTr ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: Central Industrial Park, 11-4-11-5(1980)).
145. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
146. James Risen & Stephanie Droll, GM to Lay Off Another 4,500 Workers at 3
Plants; Sales at No. 1 Auto Firm Continue to Slide; Ford Chrysler, Some Imports Post Gains,
Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 4, 1986, at 1.
147. Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic
Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1013
(2004) (quoting Marie Michael, Detroit at 300: New Seeds of Hope for a Troubled City?,
DOLLARS AND SENSE, July/Aug. 2001, at 25).
148. Id.
149. GM's Poletown Plant Employs Few Workers from Area, Report Says, UNITED
PRESS INT'L, Nov. 29, 1989, at Financial Section.
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II. ALTERNATIVES FOR REDUCING THE UNFAIRNESS CAUSED BY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS
Commentators and courts have made several suggestions for
improving the process of economic development takings, especially in the
wake of Kelo and Poletown. The following table provides a comparison of
the suggestions based on four identified benchmarks:
TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF PROPOSED ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS MODELS*
Ease of Promotion Assurance Discouragement
Model Application of Fairness of Success of Capture Rating**
Kelo Standard Good Poor Poor Poor 6
Showing of Necessity Poor Adequate Poor Adequate 6
Heightened Judicial Scrutiny Poor Adequate Good Adequate 8
Bright-Line Rule Good Poor Poor Good 8
Public Benefit Standard Adequate Poor Poor Adequate 6
Reasonably Certain Benefits Poor Poor Good Adequate 7
Standard
Just Compensation Model*** Good Good Adequate Adequate 10
* Each model is ranked as Good, Adequate, or Poor with respect to the specified objectives
* Good = 3, Adequate = 2, Poor =1. These values are then summed for each model to calculate the
rating. The highest possible rating is 12, and the lowest possible rating is 4. The rationale for these
ratings is explained below.
*** The Just Compensation Model is proposed in this note, see Part IV, infra.
These suggestions may be categorized in three ways: (1) those that
attempt to modify the standard by which courts review legislative deter-
minations of public use; (2) those that seek to construe the phrase "pub-
lic use" in a conservative manner which would ban economic
development takings altogether; and (3) those that would allow eco-
nomic development to be considered a public benefit, but would require
greater care on the part of legislatures to ensure that a significant public
benefit is actually created. This section examines and critiques several
suggestions that fall into these categories.
A. Modijying the Standard of Review
When courts evaluate a legislature's determination on whether or
not a taking is consistent with the Fifth Amendment's public use require-
ment, they use the standard that Berman150 and Midkiff first devel-
oped. 151 This standard is extremely deferential; as long as the taking is
"rationally related to a conceivable public purpose," the legislature's
determination will not be disturbed. 152 In Kelo, the Court modified the
standard without overruling the prior two cases. Under Kelo, if a "legisla-
150. Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36.
151. Midkiff, 467 U.S.at 241.
152. Id. at 241.
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ture's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational" courts
should acquiesce to its determination. 53 Many commentators have sup-
ported the use of a more robust standard of review.154 This section will
discuss two of these standards.
1. Showing of Necessity
Professor Errol Meidinger has discussed a standard of review that
requires legislatures to establish that a taking is "necessary to carrying out
a public purpose." 155 Such a standard would not permit takings where
comparable property is available on the open market, and it would force
legislatures to look for less disruptive avenues to achieve economic devel-
opment before resorting to coercive takings.156 This standard of review
has two primary advantages. First, it would provide some protection for
potential targets of economic development takings.' 57 Legislatures would
be prevented from condemning property simply because it would be
cheaper than other methods, or because one group of property owners
has more political clout than another. For example, if two suitable areas
of property are available, one of which is occupied, and another of which
is available but contaminated and requiring expensive cleanup before use,
the occupied property could not be taken against the will of the owner
under this standard. The second primary benefit of this standard is that it
provides legislatures with the power to thwart holdouts. 158 If only one
parcel of property is suitable for achieving a public purpose, the con-
demnor would be able to take that property regardless of the owner's
resistance. This would make necessary takings cheaper, because owners
would not be able to successfully resist the proceedings simply because
they want to extract a better offer from the government.
Despite its benefits, adopting this standard of review would not be
an improvement over the current model. Its primary drawback is the
difficulty involved in defining the term "necessary." Arguably, even if
there are two suitable parcels of land it is not necessary to take either
because a substitute will always be available. 159 Also, this standard does
not address the problem of undercompensation because it does nothing
153. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488.
154. See infra notes 157-172 and accompanying text.
155. Errol E. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy,
11 ENvTL. L. 1, 45 (1980).
156. Id. at 47.
157. Id. at 47-48.
158. Id. at 47.
159. For illustration, assume that there are two parcels of land that would be suita-
ble for a development project. If the government tries to seize one parcel, its owner could
argue that his parcel is not "necessary" to the project, because there is another suitable
parcel of land. If the government were then to attempt to seize the second parcel, its
owner could assert the same argument. As a result, the government could not take either
parcel of land under the "necessary" standard. This may be solely an academic concern
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to encourage compensation above FMV. Finally, just because an area of
property is "necessary" for an economic development plan, it does not
follow that there is a reasonable chance that the expected benefits from
the plan will materialize. As evidenced by Poletown, it is very natural for
proponents of economic development plans to overestimate the benefits
that will result from the implementation of their plan. The necessity
standard is not effective at encouraging legislatures to form reasonable
estimates of these benefits.
2. Heightened Judicial Scrutiny
An alternative modification to the takings jurisprudence would be
to require courts to apply a heightened standard of review in evaluating a
legislature's decision to proceed with an economic development taking.
Several of the amicus curiae briefs filed in support of the petitioners in
Kelo supported this approach.' For example, the National Association
of Home Builders (NAHB) and the National Association of Realtors
(NAR) argued that "a higher level of scrutiny should be triggered [when]
a government is .. .condemning property [and] there will be a transfer
of property interest such that a private party will maintain primary own-
ership ... over the property."' 6 1 Such a standard would have allowed the
Court in Kelo to provide more oversight for legislative actions, and could
have discouraged the legislature from approving an economic develop-
ment plan with little chance of success, or one which unreasonably
favored a private party.
Professor Thomas Merrill would also support such an approach
under certain circumstances. 162 The model he supports would require
the application of heightened scrutiny when "one or more of three condi-
tions are present: high subjective value, potential for secondary rent seek-
ing, and intentional or negligent thick market bypass."' 63 Heightened
scrutiny under this model means "a rough comparison of benefits and
costs." 164 Merrill applied this model to the Poletown case, which involved
a large subjective cost (an "irreplaceable" community was destroyed), and
where the condemned property was transferred to a single entity, creating
a significant opportunity for secondary rent seeking.'6 5 Therefore, under
rather than a practical one, however, it does illustrate the difficulty involved in defining
the term "necessary."
160. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association of Home Builders &
the National Association of Realtors in Support of the Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 U.S. Briefs 108.
161. Id. at "16.
162. Merrill, supra note 50, at 90.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 111. Professor Merrill defines secondary rent seeking as condemnor
activity that aims to capture a resource's value after condemnation, "which is almost
always higher than before." Id. at 85.
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Merrill's model, it would have been appropriate to apply heightened
judicial scrutiny to the takings in Poletown, and the trial court would
have evaluated the relative costs and benefits of the proposed project.
The primary benefit of a heightened scrutiny standard is that it
decreases the likelihood that special interests will push an ill-thought-out
economic development plan through a local legislature.' 6 6 As the
Poletown case illustrated, even judges are not immune to political pres-
sure, but they are much less responsive to such pressure than local gov-
ernments.16 7 As a result, Judges might be expected to overturn
condemnation determinations that are not likely to result in significant
public benefits. This increases the risk faced by developers that they will
invest significant resources into a development plan, only to see the
courts prevent it from coming to fruition. Therefore, under a heightened
scrutiny standard, developers would be hesitant to advocate any plan
without careful consideration of its true costs and benefits to the public.
Finally, this standard also provides some additional protection to con-
demnees because courts are likely to be skeptical of takings that exclu-
sively affect low-income or minority communities, especially if suitable
land substitutes are available.168
This standard provides greater protection to landowners than that
provided by the current Kelo standard, but it still leaves the eminent
domain process open to abuse. A heightened scrutiny standard simply
shifts the burden of proof to the condemnor, and those who support
economic development plans can have plenty of proof available in the
form of economic studies, financial data, and expert testimony. Evidence
falling into these categories is easy to come by (for a price), difficult to
rebut without countervailing data, and problematic for the typically
underprivileged condemnee to obtain. 6 9 On the other hand, if con-
demnees are able to come up with evidence to rebut the models offered
by condemnors, courts face the difficulty of dealing with dueling experts,
each with his or her own interpretation of the data in direct opposition
to the other side's conclusions, resulting in a very difficult and time-
166. Id. at 90.
167. See Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Con-
temporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 673, 674 (1975) ("FJ]udges, particularly those with life
tenure, are less susceptible to many of the political pressures that can affect the actions of
elected officials.").
168. See Bird, supra note 110, at 262 ("Under this regime, government agencies
would be able to seize land only under the most extraordinary and compelling
circumstances.").
169. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in acquiring and deciphering eco-
nomic models, see Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Impact of Modern Finance Theory in
Acquisisition Cases, 53 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 4 (2003) ("Too often in these cases, one finds
courts facing overwhelmingly complex, tedious, and extreme evidence of value offered by
the parties' experts, evidence that in its worst form becomes essentially unmanageable.").
2010]
244 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 24
consuming process. 70 As a result, a heightened scrutiny standard would
be incredibly difficult to apply in the context of economic development
takings, and other approaches are preferable.
B. Disallowing Economic Development as a
Justification for Takings
Some commentators have argued that economic development tak-
ings should be banned altogether. 7 ' Proponents of this view tend to
believe that economic development takings either create too much poten-
tial for abuse of condemnees' rights, or result in too much inefficiency in
the planning process. 172 This view has crystallized into two approaches:
first, the bright-line rule that the petitions in Kelo advocated;173 and sec-
ond, the modified rule Justice O'Connor supported in her dissent to that
decision. 1
74
1. Bright-Line Rule
The most conservative approach to remedying the abuse economic
development takings can cause would be to ban them altogether, as the
petitioners in Kelo suggested.175 Under this approach, any taking with
the purpose of furthering a development plan would be per se invalid.
The primary benefit of this approach is that it would be very easy to
apply; economic development takings are not difficult to identify, and
courts would have to spend little time and effort applying this rule. In
addition, a bright-line rule would be very effective at preventing develop-
ers from employing improper influence over the local legislative process
to accomplish their goals. In Poletown, GM would not have been able to
encourage the coercive acquisition of the neighborhood, forcing it either
to look elsewhere for a site to construct its new plant, or to work to
convince Poletown residents to voluntarily sell their property by increas-
ing compensation.
Unfortunately, a necessary consequence of banning economic devel-
opment takings is the halting of a large proportion of economic develop-
ment, and as the Court noted in Kelo, the promotion of "economic
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., William A. Curran, Preventing Real Takings for Imaginary Purposes: A
Post-Kelo Public Use Proposal, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1656, 1672 (2009) ("The most straight-
forward way to prevent abusive takings is to ban all economic development takings ...
the approach advocated by the four dissenting justices in Kelo and by some scholars.").
172. See Cohen, supra note 22, at 498 (characterizing economic development tak-
ings as inefficient because "the government, able to acquire property at a discount, does
not have to consider the full costs of its plan in deciding whether the overall economic
gains accruing to society from the project outweigh the overall costs").
173. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
174. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
175. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
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development is a traditional and long-accepted function of govern-
ment."1 76 Hundreds of local governments have depended on the eminent
domain power to revitalize their communities, and the adoption of a
bright-line rule would severely hamper the efforts of city planners.
177
Also, instead of eliminating unfairness in the eminent domain process,
this rule would simply create a new kind of unfairness by giving holdouts
a disproportionate amount of power. Under a bright-line rule, a small
minority of owners in an area could bring needed economic development
to a halt for arbitrary or selfish reasons, thereby preventing the resurgence
of an entire community. A bright-line rule may be easy to apply, but
better alternatives are available in light of these defects.
2. Public Benefit Standard
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's holding in Kelo
because it gave governments the "license to transfer property from those
with fewer resources to those with more," a "perverse result" which she
believed the Founders could not have intended.17 8 O'Connor distin-
guished Kelo from both Berman and Midkiffby characterizing the takings
in the latter as ones that "directly achieved a public benefit," where "it did
not matter that the property was turned over to private use. " 79 In
Berman, the public benefit was the elimination of blight,' 8 ° and in
Midkiff, it was the elimination of a harmful land oligopoly.' As a result,
O'Connor would have allowed the condemnation to proceed in Kelo,
even if its eventual goal was to further an economic development plan,
but only if it eliminated blight or some other condition injurious to the
public.1 82 Absent such a condition, this model would prevent any taking
justified solely through economic development rationale.
O'Connor's approach has no clear benefits, and two major draw-
backs. First, it would not provide significant protection to poor commu-
nities because it is altogether too easy to classify these communities using
the "vague, amorphous term" blight. 18 3 Many jurisdictions have loose
standards for designating a community as blighted, and the communities
that are most likely to be considered blighted are the ones most in need
176. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
177. See Eddie A. Perez, The Importance of Eminent Domain in Community Devel-
opment Projects, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 109, 109 (2006) (characterizing eminent
domain as "a vital economic-development tool for municipalities").
178. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 500.
180. Id. at 480.
181. Id. at 482.
182. Id. at 500.
183. Wendell E. Prichett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 1, 3 (2003).
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of protection from overly enthusiastic city planners.' 84 As a result,
O'Connor's approach probably would not have helped the condemnees
in Poletown. This approach would also do nothing to encourage local
governments to be realistic in their predictions regarding a development
plan's success. As long as an area of land is blighted, it can be taken for
economic development purposes, regardless of the amount of negligence
or corruption involved in the planning process. The application of this
approach would result in little improvement over the current one, and
many of the methods outlined in this section would be preferable.
C. Requiring More Detailed Legislative Findings
The next two models in this section are similar to those in Part
III(A), in that they focus on providing judicial oversight for the legislative
process. However, instead of examining the motives behind economic
development takings, or evaluating the necessity of a particular taking,
they focus exclusively on the likelihood that an economic development
plan will be successful in creating a public benefit. 18 5 If a plan is not
likely to be successful, or if the benefits from implementing a plan are
likely to be small, they would prevent coercive takings altogether.186
1. Reasonably Certain Benefits Standard
The petitioners in Kelo would have preferred a bright-line rule ban-
ning economic development takings. 18 7 However, they alternatively
argued for an approach where courts would require "'reasonable cer-
tainty' that the expected public benefits will actually accrue" before
allowing an economic development taking to proceed.' 88 Accordingly,
courts could invalidate takings where the anticipated benefits from an
economic development plan are speculative or based on insufficient
data. 1 89 One benefit of this approach is that it would force legislatures
and planners to put more thought into economic development plans,
and consequently, it might be effective at preventing takings where the
potential benefits are uncertain and the costs are high.
184. In West Virginia, for example, blight includes "any area which is predomi-
nantly open and which because of lack of accessibility, obsolete platting, diversity of
ownership, deterioration of structures or site improvements, or otherwise, substantially
impairs or arrests the sound growth of the community." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-11 B-3
(2010).
185. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487.
186. Id.
187. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
188. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487.
189. Brief of Amici Curiae the Property Rights Foundation of America at *14,
*18, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL
2787137.
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There are two primary problems with this model. First, it does little
to protect the rights of condemnees. It may prevent some economic
development takings from occurring, but for those that are allowed to
proceed, condemnees will still bear a disproportionately large share of the
costs, while still receiving only a small share of the benefits.19 Second, as
the Court noted in Kelo, applying this approach would require courts to
second guess "considered judgments about the efficacy of. . . develop-
ment plan[s]," a task for which they are ill-suited.19 It is always difficult
to anticipate what the future holds, and the application of a vague "rea-
sonable certainty" standard is unlikely to defeat many imperfect eco-
nomic development plans absent extensive guidelines on how the
standard should be applied. Even then, requiring courts to evaluate com-
plicated financial projections is unlikely to lead to a more efficacious
result than the model currently utilized. The following section expands
on some of the difficulties involved with heavy reliance on such financial
projections.
2. Expected Return Model
The Expected Return Model involves many of the same benefits
and drawbacks of the previous one, with one significant improvement:
instead of employing a vague standard such as "reasonable certainty," this
model would require condemnors to produce expected benefit calcula-
tions that could be compared to the cost of the project. Expected benefit
is calculated by multiplying the present value of future benefits by the
probability that they will be realized, and then summing them up:'
9 2
"PixBiExpected Benefit = P i
i-o (1+r)t
In this equation, the potential benefit in terms of a dollar amount (B) is
multiplied by the probability (P) that it will occur. This value is then
divided by one plus the desired rate of return, also called the discount
rate, (r),1 93 raised to the power of (t), which represents the number of
190. The use of this model might lead to more successful economic development
plans, but this provides little consolation to condemnees who do not receive just
compensation.
191. Id. at 488.
192. In United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (E.D.N.Y.
1947), Judge Hand used a similar method to calculate expected injury by multiplying the
probably that an injury would occur by the magnitude of the injury. Similarly, expected
benefit is calculated by multiplying the probability that a benefit will occur by the magni-
tude of the benefit.
193. The discount rate represents the opportunity cost of choosing a particular
investment. The inflation rate and the rate of return on low-risk government bonds are
popular values to use for the discount rate in expected value calculations. See Jongho
Kim, Bankruptcy Law Dilemma: Appraisal of Corporate Value and its Distribution in Corpo-
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years into the future the benefit will occur.19 4 This is done for all poten-
tial future benefits, and the resulting values are summed up to calculate
the expected benefit. 195 The expected benefit can then be compared to
the cost of the project to determine whether or not it is worth pursuing.
To illustrate this approach, one can apply it to a hypothetical set of
simple facts based on those in the Poletown case. 196 Assume that ten years
after the GM plant is constructed, there is a 35% chance that the total
payout to the city (in the form of salaries and tax revenue) will be $300
million, 197 a 30% chance that the payout will be $400 million,' 98 a 20%
chance that the payout will be $350 million, 199 and a 15% chance that
the payout will be $200 million. 20 The total cost of the project is $200
million. When the plan is instituted, the rate of return Detroit could
expect to receive on an alternative investment is 7%, so this value will be
used as the discount rate.2 0 ' The expected benefit can be calculated from
this data as follows:
Expected Benefit =
$300m x 0.35 $4 00m x 0.30 $350m x 0.20 $200m x 0.15
+ + +
(1+0.07)"°  (1+0.07)10 (1+0.07)10 (1+0.07)Y°
Expected Benefit =
$53,376,675 + $61,001,915 + $35,584,450 + $15,250,479
Expected Benefit =
$165,213,520
rate Reorganization Proceedings, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 119, 167-73 (discussing
various methods for choosing a discount rate).
194. This formula is a combination between a basic present value calculation, and
a basic expected benefit calculation.
195. For simplicity's sake, this model will assume that all benefits are one-time
cash flows occurring at a definite time in the future. In reality, this analysis would also
include perpetuity and annuity calculations for recurring cash flows such as tax revenue,
as well as sensitivity analysis for the different variables.
196. The probabilities and dollar amounts in this section are used solely for illus-
trative purposes, and do not reflect the actual probabilities of success or failure of the plan
at issue in Poletown.
197. This outcome is based on circumstances where, due to increasing automa-
tion, the GM plant creates about half of the jobs that were projected.
198. This outcome is based on circumstances where GM employs the projected
number of workers, the best case scenario.
199. This outcome is based on circumstances where a few jobs are lost to automa-
tion, but the GM plant employs nearly the total amount of workers that it projected.
200. This outcome is based on the worst case scenario, where GM closes the plant
after a few years due to international competition.
201. This value is used because it is assumed that the government could have
alternatively expected to receive a 7% rate of return if it chose not to pursue GM's plan,
see supra note 193 for a brief explanation of discount rates.
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The expected benefit is less than the cost of $200 million, so a rational
actor in the position of the Detroit government would have chosen to
either forgo the project or to extract some sort of guarantee from GM
that would have increased the probability that the more positive cash-
flows would be realized. The advantage this approach has over the "rea-
sonably certain" test is that the process is well-defined, and the results are
easy to interpret.
In a world of perfect information, this method would be the best
option for reaching an efficient outcome because a rational legislature
would be highly unlikely to approve a project with expected benefits less
than its cost. 2° 2 The primary flaw of this model, however, is that infor-
mation is far from perfect. It is very difficult to settle on the proper
numbers to plug in for the many variables, and small changes can have a
large effect on the outcome. For example, in the hypothetical above,
decreasing the discount rate from 7% to 6.5% would cause an increase in
the expected benefit of almost $8 million, while increasing the number of
years to 12 would cause expected benefit to fall by almost $21 million. As
a result, while this model is very effective in theory, it is not a practical
alternative.
IV. THE JUST COMPENSATION MODEL
This section proposes a new model for conducting economic devel-
opment takings that draws on the strengths of the models analyzed above
while avoiding many of their weaknesses. The Just Compensation Model
simultaneously addresses the problem of undercompensation and the
problem of unrealistic projections by adjusting the incentives influencing
typical government and developer behavior. The result is a socially equi-
table method of achieving economic development that discourages the
implementation of development plans with little chance of success.
A. Description of the Model
The Just Compensation Model's central element involves discontin-
uing the use of FMV as a complete measure of just compensation in
favor of a system where condemnees also receive a proportion of the
developer's profit. It derives this proportion from the difference in value
between the disaggregated parcels of land that are condemned and the
value of those parcels as a combined unit. As discussed in Part II(A)(2),
the value of a single large parcel of land is greater than the sum of its
parts. As a result, the FMV of a parcel of property could be $85,000
when it is owned by individual condemnees, but worth $200,000 when
202. For further explanation, consider a project with a cost that is $10 greater
than its expected benefit. A rational actor would just as soon invest in this project as burn
a $10 bill. It can be hoped that, given a choice, a legislature would not pursue either
option.
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owned by a single developer. 20 3 The transfer of this property to a devel-
oper at a significant discount decreases the developer's incentive to maxi-
mize the benefits of the project for the community which is being
developed; even if the developer loses $100,000 of its investment, it will
still own an asset worth $200,000. If the amount of this initial transfer is
reduced, developers will be correspondingly less likely to implement
plans which involve little chance of success, because payouts will come
from overseeing a successful project rather than from a large discount
which is obtained when condemned land is initially purchased.
The drawback of taking this entire wealth transfer away from devel-
opers is that it would drastically reduce the incentive to propose develop-
ment plans. Engaging in economic development can be a risky
proposition, and the transfer of property at a discount can be used as a
hedge against the potential for failure. As a result, instead of eliminating
this transfer, the more efficient way to balance the many countervailing
incentives involved is to allow condemnees to share in the increase in
property value that occurs when condemned properties are assembled.
This could be achieved by allowing condemnees' to receive income from
two sources, instead of limiting compensation to FMV. First, the con-
demning government should pay FMV for the disaggregated property.
Second, the developer should pay the difference between the FMV of the
disaggregated properties and the FMV of the assembled parcel of land.
Using the numbers from the example above, the calculation would look
like this:
Just Compensation = FMV + (Aggregated Parcel - FMV)
Just Compensation = $85,000 + ($200,000 - $85,000)
Just Compensation = $85,000 + $115,000
Just Compensation = $200,000
In this example, the government would pay $85,000 to condemnees, and
the developer would pay $115,000, for a total of $200,000 in
compensation.
Under this model, condemnees are better off because they would
receive $200,000 instead of $85,000. The government is better off
because the cost of appropriating the land has not increased, while at the
same time, it is less likely that an unsuccessful development plan will be
implemented. Finally, while the position of the developers is less advanta-
geous than under the current system, they still receive a direct wealth
transfer of $85,000. An additional aspect of this model that is likely to
benefit all parties involved is that its application is less likely to be politi-
cally controversial. Some property owners might still resist condemnation
even when offered extremely generous amounts of additional compensa-
203. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text for an explanation of these
values.
JUSTICE AND THE JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE
tion, but it is less likely that they would be able to drum up as much
sympathy from the general public. This value is difficult to understate.
Because of the political opposition to the Poletown condemnations, the
GM plant's construction was delayed for four years after the Michigan
Supreme Court decision,2 4 and similarly, public opposition has pre-
vented the New London economic development plan from being totally
implemented despite the fact that the property was condemned in 2000,
and Kelo was decided in 2005.205
B. How does the Just Compensation Model Measure Up?
1. The Benefits
When compared to the models discussed above in Part III, the Just
Compensation Model has many clear advantages. First, it is relatively
easy to apply because it is based on simple calculations. Determining the
market value of a parcel of property before and after it is assembled can
still be a challenging and somewhat subjective process, but the process is
less daunting compared to models which require the motives of local
governments and the projections of developers to be extensively ana-
lyzed.2" 6 Courts-or anyone else for that matter-are not well equipped
to analyze incredibly complicated and conflicting financial projections,
but determining the proper values to assign property is a task with which
courts have extensive experience.
20 7
Second, the Just Compensation Model is far more equitable than
the current standard. It prevents developers from capturing a substantial
portion of the benefits derived under economic development plans, and
instead, transfers a portion of this benefit to condemnees. Third, by
decreasing the windfall developers receive, this model decreases the
incentive developers have to propose development plans that are unjusti-
fiably expensive and unlikely to succeed. As a result, it is more likely that
when property owners do face condemnation proceedings, it will be for a
true public benefit, and not simply to enrich a private developer. Devel-
opers are thereby forced to depend more on profits created by the success
of the economic revitalization they are responsible for creating, rather
than the initial transfer of property which instantly appreciates in value.
204. See Higgins, supra note 128, at C1.
205. Robert S. Poliner, Taking Control" Will the Legislature Stand Up for Private
Property Rights and Put a Stop to Government Abuse of Eminent Domain?, HARTFORD
COURANT, 2010, at Cl ("[The] "95 acres remain undeveloped [and] Pfizer is moving its
New London operation to Groton.").
206. See generally Israel Shaked et al., Playing the Market (Approach): Going Beyond
the DCFMethodology, 28-Jan. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 58, 59-60 (2010) (discussing some of
the many difficulties involved in financial modeling).
207. See Bethany Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do: Evidence from
the Oregon Experiment, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281, 1315-1316 (2009) (discussing valu-
ations performed by various courts).
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Finally, the Just Compensation Model decreases the threat of political
capture and undue economic influence by reducing the payout that can
be obtained through the application of such influence. If the primary
source of profit developers expect to receive from a project depends upon
the performance of their development plan, they have less of a motive to
distort the political process by forcing through a plan that is flawed.
2. The Costs
The most significant barrier to the implementation of the Just
Compensation Model is that local governments would find it difficult to
adopt, at least initially. There is intense competition between local and
state governments to attract developers into their communities, and any
government that implemented this model would be at a severe disadvan-
tage because it would be deprived of a significant incentive to offer devel-
opers.2 °8 As a result, this model would have to be implemented on a wide
scale, at least on a regional level and preferably on a national level, to
prevent a single state or city from being at a severe disadvantage relative
to its neighbors. This could be achieved through widespread state consti-
tutional amendments which redefine just compensation, or through an
amendment to the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Constitu-
tion. Neither strategy would be easy to accomplish.
The second flaw in this model is that it assumes that individual
properties will be significantly more valuable once they have been assem-
bled. This may not always be the case, and as a result, the model has less
useful application in some circumstances.2 °9 In such situations, the com-
pensation condemnees obtain under the Just Compensation Model may
be little more than what they would receive under the current system,
and they still may not receive enough remuneration to compensate them
208. See Roger C. Hartley, Preemption's Market Participant Immunity-A Consti-
tutional Interpretation: Implications for Living Wage and Labor Peace Policies, 5 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 229, 245-46 (2003) ("Local governments compete with one another to
attract the investment of private capital into the community by offering incentive pack-
ages that include direct grants [and] low-interest loans."); Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard
Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 633, 676 (1991) ("Local
governments often compete with one another to attract high-ratable developments, and
this competition leads to either the watering down of requirements, or the inflating of
inducements."); Vicki Been, "Exit" as Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 512 (1991) ("Additional
data about the nature of the competitive pressures municipalities face in bargaining with
developers can be derived from evidence that local governments compete for new
businesses.").
209. As discussed in note 100 above, the intended use of an area of property once
it is assembled can significantly affect its value. As a result, if property is assembled to
facilitate the construction of a project that is expected to produce a relatively small
amount of income, the value of the assembled property will be closer to the aggregate
value of the individual parcels before they were assembled. Applying the Just Compensa-
tion Model would not be as beneficial in such situations.
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for the full cost of losing their property. These costs are admittedly sig-
nificant, but they are not prohibitive, especially in light of the benefits of
the model discussed above. Reform of the economic development pro-
cess, while challenging to accomplish, would be well worth the cost.
V. CONCLUSION
The objectives of the Just Compensation Model are twofold. 'First,
the model provides additional compensation to condemnees who, under
the current system, often suffer losses that are not accounted for in FMV
calculations. Second, it brings the interests of developers more in line
with those of the communities they develop by ensuring that a greater
proportion of the profits derived from economic development projects
comes from successfully carrying out a plan, rather than from initial
wealth transfers. To accomplish these objectives, the model allows con-
demnees to receive, in addition to FMV, the surplus value which is cre-
ated when individual parcels of land are assembled.
This approach has several advantages over the current model, as well
as over many of the suggestions outlined above. Those suggestions focus
primarily on either protecting the rights of condemnees (such as those
which would disallow economic development takings altogether) or
ensuring the success of economic development plans (such as those that
would employ a heightened standard of review), but only the Just Com-
pensation Model focuses on both. Once implemented, the Just Compen-
sation Model would be relatively easy to apply, and it would be extremely
effective at eliminating a large portion of the unfairness that exists in the
current system. At the same time, it would not totally deprive local gov-
ernments of an important and valuable economic tool. Most impor-
tantly, this model would drastically reduce the frequency of situations
where condemnees are saddled with a disproportionately large share of
the costs that accrue from economic development projects. An approach
to economic development takings that puts justice back into just com-
pensation is long past due, and the Just Compensation Model would go a
long way toward accomplishing this goal.
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